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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
7 AT SEATTLE

8 KRISTA PEOPLES,

9 Plaintiff,

10 v.

11 UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE  
ASSOCIATION, *et al.*,

12 Defendants.  
13  
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NO. C18-1173RSL

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'  
MOTION TO DISMISS

15 This matter comes before the Court on “Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.” Dkt. # 12.<sup>1</sup>  
16 Plaintiff alleges that defendant United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) engaged in  
17 per se unfair acts in the business of insurance when it curtailed her benefits under the Personal  
18 Injury Protection (“PIP”) provisions of her automobile policy. Plaintiff specifically alleges that  
19 USAA refused to pay medical provider bills whenever a computerized review process indicated  
20 that the bill ran afoul of a pre-determined screen or limit. She alleges that the failure to  
21 investigate or otherwise make an individualized determination regarding the reasonableness or  
22 necessity of the provider’s charges before denying payment violates Washington’s insurance  
23 regulations. See Folweiler Chiropractic, PS v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 5 Wn. App. 1002, 2018 WL  
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27 <sup>1</sup> Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied.

1 4087573, \* 3-4 (Aug. 27, 2018). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on behalf of similarly situated  
2 insureds asserting a claim under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”).

3 Defendants seek dismissal of the CPA claim on the grounds that plaintiff has failed to  
4 allege (1) an injury to “business or property” that is cognizable under the statute, (2) an unfair or  
5 deceptive act or practice by defendants, (3) an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive a  
6 substantial portion of the public, or (4) a causal connection between defendants’ acts and a  
7 legally cognizable injury. Only the unfair/deceptive act, public interest, and the causation issues  
8 are discussed below. The Court certified the injury to “business or property” issue to the  
9 Washington Supreme Court in a separate order.  
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11 For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume the truth of plaintiff’s allegations and  
12 draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561  
13 (9th Cir. 1987).<sup>2</sup> The question for the Court is whether the facts in the complaint sufficiently  
14 state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The  
15 allegations must give rise to something more than mere speculation that plaintiff has a right to  
16 relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  
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21 <sup>2</sup> To the extent defendants are challenging plaintiff’s ability to prove her allegation that  
22 defendants failed to investigate or otherwise make an individualized determination regarding the  
23 reasonableness or necessity of the provider’s charges before denying payment, that issue cannot be  
24 decided in the context of a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that USAA’s screening mechanisms  
25 resulted in coverage decisions being made without proper investigation, without knowing anything  
26 about the reasonableness of a specific provider’s charges, and without knowing why the provider  
27 thought the treatment was necessary. The fact that defendants’ “Explanations of Reimbursement”  
28 contained a cryptic, formulaic note to “see attached physician letter”(see, e.g., Dkt. # 1-1 at 38) is  
insufficient to prove that defendants hired an independent medical examiner like the one in Koch v.  
Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 108 Wn. App. 500, 504 (2001), to review the reasonableness and necessity  
of certain charges or otherwise disprove plaintiff’s allegations.

1 Having reviewed the complaint under the appropriate standard, the Court finds that  
2 plaintiff has adequately alleged a per se unfair act,<sup>3</sup> public interest, and a causal connection  
3 between the unfair acts and the injuries alleged. If the Washington Supreme Court determines  
4 that some or all of the type of injuries alleged are cognizable under the CPA, the claim may  
5 proceed.  
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8 Dated this 4th day of March, 2019.

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10 Robert S. Lasnik  
11 United States District Judge  
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20 <sup>3</sup> Defendants have not shown that plaintiff is bound by the terms of the settlement negotiated by  
21 the parties in MySpine, PS v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 12-2-32635-5 SEA (Wn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11,  
22 2015), or that the Final Approval Order entered in that case bars the claims asserted here. The order  
23 specifically states that “nothing herein shall be construed as affecting or limiting any claim that the  
24 USAA Entities’ policies or practices . . . are unfair consumer protection act practices . . .” Dkt. # 12-1  
25 at 18 (¶ 29). The state court was apparently willing to sign off on the parties’ agreement that using a  
26 computerized screening methodology, in and of itself, is not a breach of applicable law. That does not,  
27 however, mean that using a computerized screening methodology immunizes defendant from future  
28 claims. A claim, such as that asserted here, that USAA failed to make an adequate investigation of  
reasonableness or necessity despite the use of a computerized screening methodology, is not barred by  
the MySpine settlement documents.